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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the importance of scientifically informed philosophy and 
philosophically informed science for improving extant approaches to the study of the mind, and 
in particular, of conscious awareness. By using the work of Patrick Suppes as an illustration, the 
paper shows that a balance between science and philosophy is needed not only to produce new 
insights, but also to prevent dogmatism. 
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The work of Patrick Suppes is hard to categorize. It is not speculative philosophy in 
which thought experiments are proposed in order to guide intuitions, which are then 
assessed in “sub-disciplined” ways (e.g., epistemology, metaphysics, ethics). Such 
methodology appeals only to those who are already committed to reflective thought as 
the main source of truth. Suppes’ work may be interpreted as a reaction against this 
way of tackling philosophical questions. But Suppes’ work is not strictly experimental 
either, because typically philosophical questions are not set aside or ignored in order to 
promote a narrow focus on testable questions. Suppes is neither a typical “armchair” 
philosopher nor a typical scientist. 
In philosophy, this issue concerning methodology is a very central one, but the 
tension between theory and experimentation is present in all types of inquiry. 
Regarding philosophy, the methodological view that philosophical questions cannot be 
answered through scientific experimentation has a negative and a positive version.  
According to the negative version, philosophical puzzles need clarification, rather 
than solutions. Experiments are of no use to address philosophical problems precisely 
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because experiments are empirical solutions to specific testable questions. The 
problems of philosophy are unlike any other kind of problem because what they 
demand is clarity and a deeper understanding of the problem itself, rather than 
experimental responses or solutions to the problem. This approach to philosophy, 
associated with the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, is negative in the sense that 
philosophy has not much to offer to science and scientific truth because it does not 
offer solutions of any kind, particularly scientific solutions—thinking that philosophy 
could offer any scientific insight is a complete misunderstanding of philosophy. In doing 
science, philosophical questions must be avoided. 
According to the positive view, philosophical problems are the most important 
scientific problems, and science would be a blind exercise in empty empirical 
confirmation without the guidance of philosophy. Not only are the problems of 
philosophy the most important scientific problems, they are also the most central 
problems for the general project of living a good life. Scientific methodology is, 
therefore, not only insufficiently equipped to deal with the central problems in science, 
but also hopelessly limited to tackle the most important problems concerning our 
human existence. It is because of this limitation that speculative philosophy must play 
a central role both in scientific reasoning and in intellectual inquiries. In doing science, 
philosophical questions cannot be avoided, and they must guide all other questions, 
including technical or experimental ones. 
At the opposite extreme is the view that philosophical problems should be addressed 
with scientific methodology. Unlike the two versions of the view that scientific 
methodology is inadequate to answer philosophical questions, this view claims that, on 
the contrary, scientific methodology is the only way in which one can responsibly 
answer these questions. Such a view, taken to the extreme, is associated with the work 
of Willard Van Orman Quine, who said about epistemology (the theory of knowledge, 
rationality and understanding) that it should become a “chapter of psychology.” This 
strong view is generally known as the “replacement” naturalist approach to 
philosophy. Naturalism, more broadly (and less strongly), is the view that the scientific 
method should help answering philosophical questions and that philosophy must at 
least be compatible with scientific evidence. 
Philosophical priority and naturalism are opposing views. One confronts them in 
most contemporary philosophy. But instead of being torn by these opposing 
methodological forces, one may interpret them as challenges. Philosophical priority is 
the challenge to resist scientism—to avoid reducing (and misinterpreting) every 
important philosophical question to a technical or empirical question. Naturalism is 
the challenge to resist unconstrained speculation—to make philosophy compatible 
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with science by testing its conclusions with the scientific method. Striking a balance 
between these views—meeting both challenges—is what I think Suppes tried to 
achieve in his work, and he may have succeeded with respect to at least two critical 
requirements to meet these challenges. 
The first way in which Suppes met these challenges was by not endorsing the 
superiority of either philosophy or scientific methodology. Too frequently one finds 
philosophers and scientist preaching and pontificating, rather than engaging in real 
debate. Verbal disputes, dogmatism, and misunderstandings are natural consequences 
of favoring one approach over the other. The second and related way in which Suppes 
stroke a balance is by not imposing jargon produced by a small group of philosophers 
on the way in which scientists describe or understand a problem, and vice versa. 
Striking a balance between speculation and experimentation is difficult in any area 
of research. It is in studying the conscious mind, however, that this tension is at its 
most explicit and vivid. Some researchers believe in what is called “the hard problem” 
of consciousness, while others think this problem is confused or meaningless.  Some 
researchers think neuroscience will provide the final solution to any problem 
concerning consciousness while others are deeply skeptical about this hypothesis. Some 
think understanding consciousness is going to require changing fundamental 
assumptions about how we currently understand the world while others think no such 
revision is necessary. 
In his work, Suppes brought philosophical rigor concerning the exact meaning of 
terms to experimental questions that could help advance philosophical understanding. 
At the same time, Suppes showed that scientific inquiry could produce important 
philosophical insights, test philosophical questions, and constrain philosophical 
speculation. Suppes’ work on neuroscience and quantum cognition illustrates this 
effort. Since these are contributions that are emphasized in the present volume, I shall 
briefly focus on his work on the theory of measurement, particularly in psychology.  
In his characteristically balanced style, Suppes focused a substantial amount of his 
attention and efforts on problems concerning the meaning and importance of 
measurements in different sciences. In particular, Suppes was interested in a question 
that is as philosophically important as it is scientifically fundamental: what is, exactly, 
the epistemic status of measurements—what kind of knowledge do they provide, how 
do they provide such knowledge, and is there a general theory of measurement that is 
part of a general theory of knowledge? The opening paragraph of his influential co-
authored volume on measurement theory reads as follows: 
Although measurement is one of the gods modern psychologists pay homage to 
with great regularity, the subject of measurement is as elusive as ever. A 
systematic treatment of the theory is not readily found in the psychological 
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literature. For the most part, a student of the subject is confronted with an array 
of bewildering and conflicting catechisms, catechisms that tell him whether such 
and such a ritual is permissible or, at least, whether it can be condoned. To cite 
just one peculiar, yet uniformly accepted, example, as elementary science 
students we are constantly warned that it ‘does not make sense’ (a phrase often 
used when no other argument is apparent) to add numbers representing distinct 
properties, say, height and weight. (Suppes and Zinnes, 1963, 3) 
Independently of the merits of these claims, it is clear that Suppes is interested in 
the intellectual balance described above. Clear definitions and argumentation are at 
the center of the analysis (a typically philosophical demand) but the question is about 
how to interpret scientific methodology. The goal is theoretical in nature—to develop 
a theory of measurement—but the focus of the analysis is the very practice of science. 
Other volumes on the theory of measurement followed, and active engagement was 
fostered. These are now classics on the topic of measurement. They produced the type 
of exchange that is at once productive and balanced. There was no pontification and 
misunderstanding. It is important to emulate this attitude in contemporary debates, 
particularly on consciousness.  
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